The Prisoner's Dilemma Bibliography

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[ASH06] Ashlock W. and Ashlock D., Changes in prisoner’s dilemma strategies over evolutionary time with different population sizes. In Proceedings of the 2006 Congress On Evolutionary Computation, pp 1001–1008, 2006.

[AXE95] Axelrod R. and D'Ambrosio L. Announcement for Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:190, 1995

[AXE97] Axelrod R. The Complexity of Cooperation. Princeton University Press, 1997

[AXE84] Axelrod R. M. The Evolution of Cooperation. BASIC Books, New York, 1984

[AXE80a] Axelrod, R. Effective Choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma. J. Conflict Resolution, 24:3-25, 1980

[AXE80b] Axelrod, R. More Effective Choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma. J. Conflict Resolution, 24:379-403, 1980

[BEA96] Beaufils B., Delahaye J. and Mathieu P., Our meeting with gradual: a good strategy for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Proceedings of the Artificial Life V, pp. 202-209, 1996.

[BIR99] Birk A. Evolution of Continuous Degrees of Cooperations in an N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Technical Report under review, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, AI-Laboratory, 1999

[BOY87] Boyd,R. and Lorberbaum, J. P. No Pure Strategy is Evolutionary Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nature, 327: 58-59, 1987

[DAR02] Darwen P and Yao X. Co-Evolution in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Intermediate Levels of Cooperation: Application to Missile Defense. International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Applications, 2(1): 83-107, 2002

[DAR01] Darwen P. and Yao X. Why More Choices Cause Less Cooperation in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Proc. Congress of Evolutionary Computation, 2001: 987-994

[DAR95] Darwen P. and Yao X. On Evolving Robust Strategies for Iterated Prisoners Dilemma. In Progress in Evolutionary Computation, LNAI 956: 276-292, 1995

[DAV97] Davis M. Game Theory. A Nontechnical Introduction. Dover Publications, 1997

[FOG93] Fogel D. Evolving Behaviours in the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma. Evolutionary Computation, 1(1):77-97, 1993

[FRI71] Friedman J., A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1): 1–12, 1971

[GOL91] Goldstein J. Reciprocity in Superpower Relations: An Empirical Analysis, International Studies Quarterly, 35:195-209, 1991

[HIN09] Hingston P., Iterated prisoner’s dilemma for species, IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG’09), pp. 17-24, 2009.

[KOM68] Komorita S., Sheposh J., and Braver S., Power, the use of power, and cooperative choice I a two-person game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 8, pp. 134-142, 1968.

[KRA89] Kraines D. and Kraines V., Pavlov and the Prisoner's Dilemma, Theory and Decision, Vol 26(1), pp. 47-79, 1989.

[LI07] Li J., How to design a strategy to win an IPD tournament, in G. Kendall, X. Yao and S. Chong (eds.) The iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 20 years on. World Scientific, chapter 4, pp. 89-104, 2007.

[LI09] Li J. and Kendall G., A strategy with novel evolutionary features for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Evolutionary Computation, vol.17, no.2, pp. 257-274, 2009.

[LOR94] Lorberbaum J., No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 168, pp. 117-130, 1994.

[MAY82] Maynard Smith, J. Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

[MAY73] Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G. The logic of animal conflict, Nature, 246 (5427): 15–18, 1973.

[MIT09]  Mittal S. and. Deb K, Optimal strategies of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma problem for multiple conflicting objectives, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, Vol. 13 (3), pp. 554-565, 2009.

[NAC92] Nachbar J., Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 19(3): 307-326, 1992.

[NAS53] Nash J. Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica 21: 128-140, 1953.

[NAS50] Nash J. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18: 150-155, 1950.

[NOW92] Nowak M. and Sigmund K., Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations, Nature, 355, 250-252, 1992.

[ORI00] O'Riordan C. A Forgiving Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3(4), 2000.

[ORI00] O'Riordan and Bradish S. Experiments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Voter's Paradox. 11th Irish Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, 2000.

[POU92] Poundstone W. Prisoner's Dilemma, Doubleday, 1992.

[PRE12] Press W. and Dyson F., Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent, PNAS, 109(26): 10409-10413, 2012.

[RAP96] Rapoport A. Optimal policies for the prisoners dilemma, Tech report No. 50, Psychometric Laboratory, Univ. North Carolina, NIH Grant, MH-10006, 1996.

[ROB90] Robson A., Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash, and the secret handshake, Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 144, pp. 379-396, 1990.

[ROG07] Rogers A., Dash R., Ramchurn S., Vytelingum P. and Jennings N., Coordinating team players within a noisy iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 377, no.1-3, pp. 243-259, 2007.

[SCO63] Scodel A. Probability Preferences and Expected Values. Journal of Psychology, 56:429-434, 1963.

[SCO62] Scodel A. Induced Collaboration in Some Non-Zero-Sum Games, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6: 335-340, 1962.

[SCO60a] Scodel A. and Sayer M. J. The Behavior of Prisoners in a 'Prisoner's Dilemma' Game, Journal of Psychology, 50: 133-138, 1960.

[SCO60b] Scodel A. et al. Some Descriptive Aspects of Two-Person, Non-Zero-Sum Games, II, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4: 193-197, 1960.

[SCO59a] Scodel A. and Philburn R. Some Personality Correlates of Decision Making under Conditions of Risk, Behavioral Science, 4: 19-28, 1959.

[SCO59b] Scodel A. et al. Some Descriptive Aspects of Two-Person, Non-Zero-Sum Games, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3: 114-119, 1959.

[SLA07] Slany W. and Kienreich W., On some winning strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in Kendall G., Yao X. and Chong S. (eds.) The iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 20 years on. World Scientific, chapter 8, pp. 171-204, 2007.

[STE12] Stewart A. and Plotkin J., Extortion and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, PNAS, 109(26): 10134-10135, 2012.

[SUG86] Sugden R., The economics of cooperation, Rights and Welfare. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1986.

[THO85] Thomas B., On evolutionarily stable sets, Journal of Mathematical Biology, 22: 105–115, 1985.

[TZA00] Tzafestas E., Toward adaptive cooperative behaviour, Proceedings of the Simulation of Adaptive Behavior Conference, pp. 334-340, 2000.

[VON44] von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944.

[YAO99] Yao, X and Darwen P. How Important is Your Reputation in a Multi-Agent Environment. Proc. Of the 1999 IEEE Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, USA, pp. 575-580, Oct. 1999.