**The Prisoner's Dilemma Bibliography**

[**ASH06**] Ashlock W. and Ashlock D., Changes in
prisoner’s dilemma strategies over evolutionary time with different
population sizes. In *Proceedings of the 2006 Congress On Evolutionary
Computation*, pp 1001–1008, 2006.

[**AXE95**]
Axelrod R. and D'Ambrosio L.
Announcement for Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation. Journal
of Conflict Resolution 39:190, 1995

[**AXE97**] Axelrod R. The Complexity of
Cooperation.

[**AXE84**] Axelrod R. M. The Evolution of Cooperation. BASIC Books,

[**AXE 80a**]
Axelrod, R. Effective Choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
J. Conflict Resolution, 24:3-25, 1980

[**AXE80b**] Axelrod, R. More Effective
Choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma. J. Conflict Resolution, 24:379-403,
1980

[**BEA96**]
Beaufils B., Delahaye J.
and Mathieu P., Our meeting with gradual: a good strategy for the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma, *Proceedings of
the Artificial Life V*, pp. 202-209, 1996.

[**BIR99**] Birk A. Evolution of
Continuous Degrees of Cooperations in an N-Player
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Technical Report under review, Vrije
Universiteit Brussel,
AI-Laboratory, 1999

[**BOY87**] Boyd,R.
and Lorberbaum, J. P. No Pure Strategy is
Evolutionary Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nature, 327: 58-59,
1987

[**DAR02**] Darwen P and

[**DAR01**] Darwen P. and Yao X. Why More Choices Cause Less Cooperation in
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Proc. Congress of Evolutionary Computation, 2001:
987-994

[**DAR95**] Darwen P. and Yao X. On Evolving Robust
Strategies for Iterated Prisoners Dilemma. In Progress in Evolutionary
Computation, LNAI 956: 276-292, 1995

[**DAV97**]

[**FOG93**] Fogel D. Evolving Behaviours in the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma.
Evolutionary Computation, 1(1):77-97, 1993

[**FRI71**]
Friedman J., A
Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, *Review of Economic Studies*, 38 (1): 1–12, 1971

[**GOL91**] Goldstein J. Reciprocity in Superpower Relations:
An Empirical Analysis, International Studies Quarterly, 35:195-209, 1991

[**HIN09**]
Hingston P., Iterated prisoner’s dilemma for
species, *IEEE Symposium on Computational
Intelligence and Games* (CIG’09), pp. 17-24, 2009.

[**KOM68**] Komorita
S., Sheposh J., and Braver S., Power, the use of
power, and cooperative choice I a two-person game, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 8, pp. 134-142,
1968.

[**KRA89**]
Kraines D. and Kraines V.,
Pavlov and the Prisoner's Dilemma, *Theory
and Decision*, Vol 26(1), pp. 47-79, 1989.

[**LI07**]
Li J., How to design a strategy to win an IPD tournament, in G. Kendall, X. Yao
and S. Chong (eds.) *The** iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 20 years
on*. World Scientific, chapter 4, pp. 89-104, 2007.

[**LI09**]
Li J. and Kendall G., A strategy with novel evolutionary features for the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma, *Evolutionary
Computation*, vol.17, no.2, pp. 257-274, 2009.

[**LOR94**]
Lorberbaum J., No strategy is evolutionarily stable in
the repeated prisoner's dilemma, *Journal
of Theoretical Biology*, 168, pp. 117-130, 1994.

[**MAY82**] Maynard Smith, J.
Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

[**MAY73**] Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G.
The logic of animal conflict, *Nature*, 246 (5427): 15–18, 1973.

[**MIT09**] Mittal S. and. Deb K, Optimal strategies of
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma problem for multiple conflicting
objectives, *IEEE Transactions on
Evolutionary Computation*, Vol. 13 (3), pp. 554-565, 2009.

[**NAC92**]
Nachbar J., Evolution in the finitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 19(3): 307-326, 1992.

[**NAS53**] Nash J. Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica 21: 128-140, 1953.

[**NAS50**] Nash J. The Bargaining Problem.
Econometrica 18: 150-155, 1950.

[**NOW92**] Nowak M. and Sigmund K., Tit for tat in
heterogeneous populations, *Nature*,
355, 250-252, 1992.

[**ORI00**] O'Riordan C. A Forgiving Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3(4), 2000.

[**ORI00**]
O'Riordan
and Bradish S. Experiments in the Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma and the Voter's Paradox. 11th Irish Conference
on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, 2000.

[**POU92**] Poundstone W.
Prisoner's Dilemma, Doubleday, 1992.

[**PRE12**]
Press W. and Dyson F., Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary
opponent, *PNAS*, 109(26): 10409-10413,
2012.

[**RAP96**] Rapoport A. Optimal
policies for the prisoners dilemma, Tech report No.
50, Psychometric Laboratory, Univ. North Carolina, NIH Grant, MH-10006, 1996.

[**ROB90**]
Robson A., Efficiency in evolutionary games: *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, vol.
144, pp. 379-396, 1990.

[**ROG07**]
Rogers A., Dash R., Ramchurn S., Vytelingum P. and Jennings N., Coordinating team players within a
noisy iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament, *Theoretical
Computer Science*, vol. **377,** no.1-3, pp. 243-259, 2007.

[**SCO63**] Scodel A. Probability Preferences and Expected Values. Journal of
Psychology, 56:429-434, 1963.

[**SCO62**] Scodel A. Induced
Collaboration in Some Non-Zero-Sum Games, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6:
335-340, 1962.

[**SCO 60a**]
Scodel A.
and Sayer M. J. The Behavior of Prisoners in a 'Prisoner's Dilemma' Game, Journal
of Psychology, 50: 133-138, 1960.

[**SCO60b**] Scodel A. et al. Some
Descriptive Aspects of Two-Person, Non-Zero-Sum Games, II, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 4: 193-197, 1960.

[**SCO 59a**]
Scodel A.
and Philburn R. Some Personality Correlates of
Decision Making under Conditions of Risk, Behavioral
Science, 4: 19-28, 1959.

[**SCO59b**] Scodel A. et al. Some
Descriptive Aspects of Two-Person, Non-Zero-Sum Games, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 3: 114-119, 1959.

[**SLA07**]
Slany W. and Kienreich
W., On some winning strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in
Kendall G., Yao X. and Chong S. (eds.) *The
iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 20 years on*. World
Scientific, chapter 8, pp. 171-204, 2007.

[**STE12**]
Stewart A. and Plotkin J., Extortion and cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma, *PNAS*,
109(26): 10134-10135, 2012.

[**SUG86**]
Sugden R., The economics of cooperation, Rights and
Welfare. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1986.

[**THO85**]
Thomas B., On evolutionarily
stable sets, *Journal of Mathematical Biology*, 22: 105–115, 1985.

[**TZA00**]
Tzafestas E., Toward
adaptive cooperative behaviour, *Proceedings
of the Simulation of Adaptive Behavior Conference*,
pp. 334-340, 2000.

[**VON44**] von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior.

[**YAO99**]