The Prisoner's Dilemma Bibliography
[ASH06] Ashlock W. and Ashlock D., Changes in prisoner’s dilemma strategies over evolutionary time with different population sizes. In Proceedings of the 2006 Congress On Evolutionary Computation, pp 1001–1008, 2006.
[AXE95] Axelrod R. and D'Ambrosio L. Announcement for Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:190, 1995
[BEA96] Beaufils B., Delahaye J. and Mathieu P., Our meeting with gradual: a good strategy for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Proceedings of the Artificial Life V, pp. 202-209, 1996.
[DAR02] Darwen P and
[FRI71] Friedman J., A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1): 1–12, 1971
[HIN09] Hingston P., Iterated prisoner’s dilemma for species, IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG’09), pp. 17-24, 2009.
[KOM68] Komorita S., Sheposh J., and Braver S., Power, the use of power, and cooperative choice I a two-person game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 8, pp. 134-142, 1968.
[KRA89] Kraines D. and Kraines V., Pavlov and the Prisoner's Dilemma, Theory and Decision, Vol 26(1), pp. 47-79, 1989.
[LI07] Li J., How to design a strategy to win an IPD tournament, in G. Kendall, X. Yao and S. Chong (eds.) The iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 20 years on. World Scientific, chapter 4, pp. 89-104, 2007.
[LI09] Li J. and Kendall G., A strategy with novel evolutionary features for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Evolutionary Computation, vol.17, no.2, pp. 257-274, 2009.
[MAY82] Maynard Smith, J. Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[MIT09] Mittal S. and. Deb K, Optimal strategies of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma problem for multiple conflicting objectives, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, Vol. 13 (3), pp. 554-565, 2009.
[NAC92] Nachbar J., Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 19(3): 307-326, 1992.
[NOW92] Nowak M. and Sigmund K., Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations, Nature, 355, 250-252, 1992.
[ORI00] O'Riordan C. A Forgiving Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3(4), 2000.
[ORI00] O'Riordan and Bradish S. Experiments in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Voter's Paradox. 11th Irish Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, 2000.
[PRE12] Press W. and Dyson F., Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent, PNAS, 109(26): 10409-10413, 2012.
Robson A., Efficiency in evolutionary games:
[ROG07] Rogers A., Dash R., Ramchurn S., Vytelingum P. and Jennings N., Coordinating team players within a noisy iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 377, no.1-3, pp. 243-259, 2007.
[SLA07] Slany W. and Kienreich W., On some winning strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in Kendall G., Yao X. and Chong S. (eds.) The iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 20 years on. World Scientific, chapter 8, pp. 171-204, 2007.
[STE12] Stewart A. and Plotkin J., Extortion and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, PNAS, 109(26): 10134-10135, 2012.
[SUG86] Sugden R., The economics of cooperation, Rights and Welfare. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1986.
[THO85] Thomas B., On evolutionarily stable sets, Journal of Mathematical Biology, 22: 105–115, 1985.
[TZA00] Tzafestas E., Toward adaptive cooperative behaviour, Proceedings of the Simulation of Adaptive Behavior Conference, pp. 334-340, 2000.